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THE 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED




On March 16, 2006, the current Bush administration in the United States
released its second National Security Strategy (NSS). I Although the publication
is a more low-key affair than its 2002 predecessor, the 2006 NSS is not without
some notable content. In particular, the 2006 NSS re-asserts the claim that the
United States (and presumably other states) 3 has the right to use pre-emptive
force in dealing with what it perceives as a threat which may possibly come to
fruition at some point in the future. 4 Although the United States' claim of such a
* Doctoral candidate, School of Law, University of Nottingham and Tutor in International Law,
Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool, United Kingdom. The events in this paper are as
of 20 June 2007. The author wishes to thank Professor Robert Cryer, Arjen Vemeer, and James
Green for their assistance in preparing this article although any errors are the author's sole
responsibility (E-mail: llxcmh@nottingham.ac.uk).
1. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (March 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/NSS/2006/NSS2006.pdf [hereinafter 2006 NSS].
2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (September 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/NSS/2002/NSS.pdf [hereinafter 2002 NSS]; see Tom
Farer, The Bush Doctrine and the UN Charter Frame, 37 INT'L SPECTATOR 91 (2002); see also
Christine Gray, The US National Security Strategy and the New "Bush Doctrine" of Preemptive
Self-defense, I CHINESE J. INT'L. L. 437 (2002); Christian Henderson, The Bush Doctrine: From
Theory to Practice, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 3 (2004).
3. There is nothing in the NSS to suggest that the doctrine of pre-emption is restricted to use
by the United States. For the proposition that "pre-emptive self-defense is only an American
doctrine" see W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 82, 90 (2003).
4. "Pre-emptive" force should be contrasted with that which is "anticipatory", that is force
used in situations where there is a threat which is imminent and to be launched in the immediate
future. The main difference between these types of action is the temporal nature of the threat
which they are responding to. There is, however, a lack of any universally agreed terminology
regarding the different modes of self-defense. The central debate surrounding the legality and
legitimacy of anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defense has been presented in many other works
and so will not be addressed in this short article. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law
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right in the 2002 NSS was not unique, 5 its significance and controversy, both
politically and legally, was magnified as a result of the speculation that
surrounded the Bush administration's foreign policy direction after the events of
September 11, 2001.6
Given the events that occurred in the four years between the release of the
two NSS documents, it is perhaps surprising that the Bush administration has
persisted with its advocacy of what was quickly coined the "Bush doctrine".7 In
particular, one could not have escaped the massive failures that have surrounded
what may be considered the test case for such a doctrine, the use of force against
Iraq, which occurred in 2003 but the consequences of which continue today.
8
Furthermore, the UN has, on the whole, not been in favor of the adoption of such
a wide unilateral right. Although (interestingly) accepting the legality of
unilateral anticipatory self-defense in response to an imminent threat, the reports
emanating from both the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
9
and the Secretary-General' 0 rejected the legality of the unilateral pre-emptive
use of force in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The 2005 World Summit Outcome
and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L. L. J. 7
(2003).
5. Previous United States administrations have made similar, if not as explicit, claims to pre-
emption. See W. Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 525, 527-532 (2006).
6. Its significance was also heightened by the fact that the claim was made by the United
States, the current sole political, economic and, most importantly, military superpower. As
Reisman and Armstrong acknowledge, "[w]hen a major international actor claims a new right or
its adjustment or termination, the implications for changing customary international law loom
especially large, for, at every level of social organization, the making of law, much more than its
institutional applications, is in great part political; doctrines of sovereign equality notwithstanding,
the actions of a great power may be more generative of law than those of smaller states." Id. at
526; see infra Part III.
7. See Farer, supra note 2; see Gray, supra note 2; see Henderson, supra note 2.
8. It should be noted, however, that the official legal justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom
provided by the United States was authorization by the Security Council. Letter from John D.
Negroponte, United States Ambassador to the U.N., to the President of the Security Council (Mar.
21, 2003), U.N. Doc. S/2003/351. Nevertheless, although the doctrine of pre-emption was more of
an underlying theme in the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom than an official legal justification, it
provided a good opportunity for the Bush administration to see how such a doctrine would work in
practice in relation to combating a threat emanating from the alleged possession of WMD.
9. The U.N. Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, % 183-98, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004).
10. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security And Human Rights For All, 122-26, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21,
2005).
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document did not even mention it, an indication of the 'continuing deep
divisions between states on the law on the use of force.' 12 Furthermore, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has given no clear principled determination
on the issue in either the Wall advisory opinion of 2004 or the DRC v Uganda
case of 2005,14 although it did make clear in the latter that "Article 51 of the
Charter may justif, a use of force in self-defense only within the strict confines
there laid down." It does not allow the use of force by a state to protect
perceived security interests beyond these parameters. Other means are available
to a concerned state including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council. 16
By contrast, states have not been wholly averse to the theory behind
unilateral pre-emptive force since the publication of the 2002 NSS. Although
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), representing 118 states, has explicitly
rejected the doctrine, 17 states as varied as Australia, 18 Israel,19 France,20
Russia, 2 1 and North Korea 22 have expressed some support for the doctrine in
11. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 77-80, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). The World Summit
took place at the U.N. headquarters in New York on September 14-16, 2005.
12. Christine Gray, The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the
USA, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 555, 566 (2006).
13. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (Jul. 9) [hereinafter Wall advisory opinion].
14. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19).
15. Id. at 148.
16. Id. This statement from the ICJ very much echoed the conclusions of the High Level Panel
and the Secretary-General. See Negroponte, supra note 8; see the U.N. Secretary General's High
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 9.
17. See XIV Conference of Heads of State or Government of The Non-Aligned Movement,
Havana, Cuba, Sept. 16, 2006, Final Document, 26, 28, available at
http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId = 1767.
18. See Richard Beeston, Australians Ready to Hit First Against Terrorists, THE TIMES, Nov. 1,
2002, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article820013.ece; Neil Frankland,
Australia Supports Pre-emptive Strikes, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/australia/story/0,,85 1884,00.html.
19. Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon - Revised, 3(One)(3) and
3(Two)(2), May 28, 2004, available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon-eng-revised.htm.
20. Le Ministre de la Defense, Projet de loi de programmation militaire 2003-2008, le 11
septembre 2002 (Fr.),
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/defense/layout/set/popup/content/view/full/2983 1, translated in
Embassy of France in the United States, 2003-2008 Military Program Bill of Law,
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/mindefa.pdf.
21. Foxnews.com, Putin: Russia Preparing Action Against Terrorists, Sept. 17, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,132687,00.html.
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connection with their individual security concerns. 23 The European Union, in its
own European Security Strategy, although stressing the need for multilateralism
and the UN Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, was also open in its support for the theoryS24
behind pre-emption.
The current crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear program makes this an
opportune moment to assess the Bush administration's persistent claim in the
2006 NSS to the right to use pre-emptive force. This article evaluates the claim
in light of the above events, and attempts to provide a balanced account of some
of the issues that arise from this, in particular the actual or potential impact upon
the jus ad bellum (international law governing when force may be used) and its
relevance in the evolving crisis concerning Iran.
II. THE THREATS IDENTIFIED IN THE 2006 NSS AND THE UNILATERAL
PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE
The 2006 NSS was released nearly four and a half years after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, but the impact of the tragic events of that day
continue to reverberate poignantly through the core of the document. "America
is at war" 25 are the first words of the letter by President Bush which precedes
the substantive sections of the NSS. Even the 2002 NSS, released less than a
year after these attacks, was less striking in this assertion.
2 6
However, the 2006 NSS is not solely a vehicle for the United States to
formally re-advocate its claim to a right of unilateral pre-emptive use of force in
fighting this war. In addition, the promotion of democracy is an underlying
theme throughout the document. It is described as "the most effective long-term
measure for conflict prevention and resolution,"' 27 and is given greater emphasis
than in the 2002 NSS. 2 8 Indeed, the 2006 NSS is a slightly moderated version of
22. North Korean Defense Chief Warns of Pre-Emptive Attack on US, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS,
Apr. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/NorthKoreanDefenseChiefWams Of PreEmptiveAttack
OnUS.html.
23. This is not an exhaustive survey.
24. European Council, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security Strategy, at 7-
8, Dec. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/2004/4/29/European%2OSecurity%2OStrat
egy.pdf
25. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at i.
26. See 2002 NSS, supra note 2.
27. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 15.
28. The 2006 NSS is 18 pages longer than its 2002 predecessor essentially because of the
increased volume of Section II: Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity.
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its predecessor, with more reliance on alternatives to military measures.29
Nevertheless, the claim to a right of unilateral pre-emptive use of force against
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is repeated in the
recent strategy; it is this short-term measure in fighting the so-called "war" on
which this paper will focus.
A. Global Terrorism
The first major threat to the United States' national security that is
identified is, unsurprisingly, that emanating from global terrorism. The 2006
NSS, like its predecessor, adopts a two-pronged strategy, stating firstly that
"[t]he advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-
term solution to the transnational terrorism of today." 30  However, the war on
terror is also described as both "a battle of ideas" and "a battle of arms," 31 so
that the use of force is also necessary in the short-term. As the 2006 NSS re-
asserts, "[i]n the short run, the fight involves using military force and other
instruments of national power."' 32 Indeed, "[t]o create the space and time for
[the] long-term solution to take root, there are four steps [which are to be taken]
in the short-term[:]"' 33
[p]revent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur[,]... [d]eny
WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without
hesitation[,] ... [d]eny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue
states[,] ... [and] [d]eny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use
as a base and launching pad for terror.
Clearly it is envisioned that, if necessary, the pre-emptive use of force may
have a role in each of these steps.
B. Weapons of Mass Destruction
Instead of placing emphasis on the long-term strategy of the promotion of
democracy and freedom, the NSS section on WMD focuses more on the long-
term diplomatic strategy of preventing states from first producing fissile
material, which is a key component to making nuclear weapons, and then
proliferating such material to rogue states or terrorists. 35 Indeed, the NSS makes
29. Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 5, at 531-32. The 2006 NSS does not advocate the use of
force in promoting democracy and freedom.
30. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 11.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 11-12.
34. For more on the strategy to prevent WMD production and proliferation, see infra Part II.B.
35. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 19-21. The strategy's first objective "requires closing a loophole
in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to
make nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear program." Id. at 20. The strategy's second
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clear that "[t]aking action need not involve military force. Our strong preference
and common practice is to address proliferation concerns through international
diplomacy, in concert with key allies and regional partners."' 36 The emphasis on
this part of the strategy is notably increased from the 2002 NSS.
Nevertheless, in combating this threat in the short-term, as in the 2002 NSS,
the use of military force is not ruled out:
[i]f necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self defense, we
do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. When the consequences of an
attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly
by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption.
The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same. We
will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. The
reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just. 37
Similar to the 2002 NSS section on the threat of global terrorism, but in
contrast to its section on WMD, 38 the 2006 NSS legally bases pre-emption on
self-defense. 39 The controversy surrounding this assertion centers on the fact
that, whereas Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that the right of self-defense,,.40
becomes available if an "armed attack occurs, the NSS goes beyond this so as
not to "rule out the use of force before attacks occur" and, going beyond the
controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, 4 1 "even if uncertainty
objective "must address the danger posed by inadequately safeguarded nuclear and radiological
material worldwide [,]" and build on the success of the proliferation security initiative (PSI). Id. at
21. The PSI is "global effort [launched by the Bush Administration in May 2003] that aims to stop
shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related material." Id. at 18. That effort was
fruitful as seventy countries have actually supported the initiative. Id.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
38. Although, the summary of the 2002 NSS in the 2006 NSS section on WMD mentions
acting "preemptively" in exercising its "inherent right of self-defense," the United States
preference is "that nonmilitary actions succeed, [as] no country should ever use preemption as a
pretext for aggression." Id. at 18.
39. Gray, supra note 12, at 563.
40. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter governs self-defense. It states that [n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... U.N. Charter art. 51. The right has been
declared to also exist in customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).
41. Although the legality of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is still controversial, and
has not been determined by the ICJ, it has received a large amount of support. See, e.g., the U.N.
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 9; see the Secretary General,
supra note 10; see also Elizabeth Wilmshurst, The Chatham House Principles of International Law
on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 INT'L. & COMp. L.Q. 963 (2006).
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remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack." The 2006 NSS makes
no reference to the requirement of imminence. This is perhaps an indication that
the Bush administration has desisted in its attempt to argue that the meaning of
this requirement in customary international law 42 should be reinterpreted so as to
expand its temporal nature in light of the contemporary threats of terrorism and
WMD, as it had in the 2002 NSS. 43 However, this is more likely an accidental
omission and of no real significance given that the 2006 NSS was clear in its
assertion that "[t]he place of pre-emption in our national security strategy
remains the same. ' 44  A notable difference between the 2002 and 2006 NSS
documents, however, is their identification of the rogue states from which the
threats of terrorism, support for terrorism, and WMD production, possession,
and proliferation emanate.
C. Adjusting the Focus: The 2006 NSS and Rogue States
In President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address, an 'axis of
evil' was identified as consisting of Iraq, Iran and North Korea.45 The 2002
NSS subsequently focused its concerns on those states. With the alleged threat
from Iraq addressed through Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the 2006 NSS it now
appears that concern has broadened to a tyrannical 'heptagon of hate' consisting
of North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe, 46 although
only North Korea, 47 Iran, 48 and Syria 49 receive any real attention.
However, given the situation in Iraq at the time of release of the 2006
NSS, 50 there was also a substantial amount of focus upon that state. In
particular, in the series of justifications offered by the NSS for the situation in
42. The requirement of imminence, along with necessity and proportionality as traditionally
cited as the controls on actions taken in self-defense date back to the correspondence that emanated
from the Caroline incident of 1837. See Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord
Ashburton, British Special Representative to the U.S. (July 27, 1842) available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm (providing this letter and
other important primary materials of the Caroline case).
43. This argument was made when it was said that "[the United States] must adapt the concept
of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." 2002 NSS, supra
note 2, at 15.
44. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 23.
45. George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/0 1/20020129-11 .html.
46. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 3.
47. Id. at 19, 21, 35. North Korea is mentioned in relation to its WMD threat.
48. Iran is mentioned in relation to its support for terrorism. Id. at 9, 12, 38. Iran is also
mentioned in relation to its WMD threat. Id. at 19, 20, 35.
49. Id. at 9, 12, 38. Syria is mentioned briefly in relation to its support for terrorism.
50. See infra note 157.
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Iraq and the causes for it, 51 it becomes immediately apparent that Iraq's pre-war
possession of WMD is not one of them. In recognition of the inaccuracy of the
pre-war intelligence estimates, and in a moment of rare humility, the 2006 NSS
noted that United States intelligence "must improve" and it "must learn from this
experience if [it is] to counter successfully the very real threat of,.,. . 52
proliferation." Nevertheless, there was "no doubt that the world is a better
place for the removal of this dangerous and unpredictable tyrant," 53 and the
deterrent aspect of the Iraq invasion was emphasized so that other rogue states
now know that "bluff, denial, and deception is a dangerous game that [they] play
at their peril." 54  This 'dangerous game' is one that the NSS claims Iran is
currently playing:
[t]he Iranian regime's true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime's
refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its
international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and
resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President
calling for Israel to "be wiped off the face of the earth. 55
Furthermore, "[t]he Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel;
seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the
aspirations of its people for freedom." 56 In short, the United States "may face no
greater challenge from a single country than from Iran."
' 57
Aside from its nuclear threat, the NSS also claims that North Korea
"counterfeits our currency; traffics in narcotics and engages in other illicit
activities; threatens the [Republic of Korea] with its army and its neighbors with
51. The 2006 NSS states that "Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of 16 UNSC resolutions
over 12 years, combined with his record of invading neighboring countries, supporting terrorists,
tyrannizing his own people, and using chemical weapons, presented a threat we could no longer
ignore." 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 23.
52. Id. at 23. The aftermath of the invasion witnessed a frenzy of publicity on the failure of the
pre-war intelligence estimates after the lack of discovery of any WMD, or serious programs of,
particularly after the final report published by the Iraq Survey Group on September 30, 2004. See
the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on
Iraq's WMD, (Sept. 30, 2004), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-
l/iraq wmd2004/index.html. Indeed, in the pursuit of improving intelligence, the United States
established an investigation to examine the failures of the intelligence which was relied upon in the
run up to the invasion. See Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd-report.pdf.
53. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 24.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Id.
57. Id. For more on the current stand-off between the United States and Iran, see infra Part IV.
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its missiles; and brutalizes and starves its people." 58 Although it was stressed in
the cases of both Iran and North Korea that the long term goal is bringing
freedom to the people of these two states, 59 it was also emphasized that until that
time all measures will be taken to protect the national and economic security of
the United States. This is a clear reference to the short-term measure of
unilateral pre-emptive self-defense as set out above in sections A and B. Having
highlighted the United States' reassertion of the claim to such a right, this paper
addresses the question as to the significance of this reassertion in terms of thejus
ad bellum framework.
III. THE CALL FOR NORMATIVE CHANGE AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW FORMATION
A. The Initial Call in the 2002 NSS
The prohibition of the threat or use of force is of fundamental importance in
the international legal system and is of both a conventional and customary
nature.6 2  The proposition that it is jus cogens has been made on several
58. Id. at 21.
59. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 20 (discussing Iran); see id. at 21 (discussing North Korea).
60. See id. at 20 (discussing Iran); see id. at 21 (discussing North Korea); see N Korea Tests
Long Range Missile, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/5148648.stm; see North Korea Claims Nuclear Test, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032525.stm (noting that since North Korea's nuclear
status was confirmed in October 2006 when it carried out a nuclear test, any talk of an attack
against it has been completely absent. That nuclear test came just a few months after it had tested
long-range missiles); see Jonathan Watts & Julian Borger, North Korea to Shut Down Nuclear
Reactor in Arms for Energy Deal, THE GUARDIAN, (London), Feb. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,2012593,00.html (noting that a breakthrough once
again appears to have been made in the six-party talks). Iran, as the 2006 NSS makes clear, is the
major current concern of the United States which will be examined in more detail in Part IV of this
paper.
61. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations."
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945), (referring to "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law"); see, e.g., 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 100; see, e.g., North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20); International Law
Association, London Conference (2000), Committee on Formation of Customary (General)
International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary
International Law, at 7, available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf (stating that
customary international law consists of an objective or material element -state practice- and a
"subjective element often referred to as opinio juris") [hereinafter I.L.A Report]; G. M.
DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 81 (Martinus Nijhoff 1993).
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occasions by different actors. 63 Thus, claims to use force in new circumstances
outside of self-defense or Security Council authorization 64 inevitably face this
major obstacle from the outset.
Nevertheless, the carving out of a new exception to the prohibition, or its
complete abolition, is not suggested in the NSS. 65 Rather, it is claimed that, due
to the contemporary threats enunciated in the NSS, the parameters of self-
defense as an established exception to the prohibition, which is also of a
conventional and customary nature, 66 should be widened to enable states to take
effective action to combat these threats. 67  In other words, because the
circumstances necessitating action in self-defense have widened, the
contemporary exception of self-defense that was formulated in times when such
circumstances were unforeseen must follow suit and permit action in pre-
emptive self-defense to be taken.
68
63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that "a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character") [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see, e.g. 1986
I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 90; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 490
(Oxford University Press 6th ed. 2003) (1966); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE 99-102 (Cambridge University Press 4th ed. 2005); see ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE 21-22 (Oxford University Press 1994)
(Higgins rejects the idea that there exists a separate category of norms with "higher normative
status." Rather, it is clear that there are certain "norms that we hold dear"); see generally
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University
Press 2006).
64. See U.N. Charter ch. VII (providing two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force
expressed in Article 2(4) of the Charter).
65. See JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 4 (Oxford University Press 6th ed. 1963) (noting
that because "[a]ny ... act or declaration may, so far as it goes, be some evidence that a custom,
and therefore that a rule of international law, does or does not exist" or is or is not emerging, the
distinct elements of state practice and opinio juris of customary international law may be
manifested in the same conduct); BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 6; see also DANILENKO, supra note
62, at 82; for examples of the forms state practice may take, see D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (Sweet and Maxwell 6th ed. 2004); Michael Akehurst,
Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1974-75); I.L.A. Report,
supra note 62, at 7, 14 (stating that "it is in fact often difficult or even impossible to disentangle
the two elements."). The NSS can therefore be considered as evidence of both U.S. state practice
and opiniojuris. For more on the distinction between physical and verbal acts see infra DII.
66. See 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40.
67. See supra note 43.
68. An important and often overlooked distinction to be made in evaluating the evolution of
rules of customary international law is whether a proposed change to existing custom concerns a
permissive or an obligatory rule. Indeed, this distinction is one that is often overlooked in the
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When the U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945, the inclusion in Article 51 of
the restriction on self-defensive measures to situations where "an armed attack
occurs" would appear to restrict any previously existing customary international
law governing the matter under the principle of lex posterior derogate priori.
69
Today, the two sources of self-defense "are substantially identical because of the
interaction between the Charter and customary international law, on the one
hand, and the virtual universality of the UN, on the other hand."' 70
Consequently, state practice in regard to self-defense is significant for both treaty
interpretation 7 1 and customary international law formation. Indeed, "[i]n most
instances, it is virtually impossible to determine for which of the two purposes
state practice is pertinent." However, if state practice was to begin to develop
involving the right of pre-emptive self-defense subsequent to the adoption of the
Charter, with the connected belief by states that it was either lawful or
necessary,7 3 to attempt to interpret Article 51 to incorporate this development
would lead to it being bent beyond breaking-point and the development of the
customary law would effectively repeal the formula for self-defense as set out in
that provision. 74
literature and in the pronouncements of the ICJ. However, whereas the formation of the latter
burdens states so that they are obliged to undertake a duty, that is to positively carry out or refrain
from action, permissive rules grant a legal right to states to carry out action. Nevertheless, the
invocation of such rights by one state may have collateral obligations for other states. Indeed,
"what is permissible in the case of state A can connote an obligation on the part of state B." I.L.A.
Report, supra note 62, at 33 n.80. Consequently, although on the basis of the involvement of a
permissive right it may consequently be thought that pre-emptive self-defense carries with it less of
a burden of proof in its establishment as custom than a rule which obliges all states, this is not the
case. For example, if a state was to decide to exercise this right, it would ultimately lead to the
fundamental rights of another state being suspended, such as territorial integrity whilst force is
being used against terrorists stationed there, and imposes obligations on states not to prevent the
state from acting.
69. A later law repeals an earlier one. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 912 (6th ed. 1990).
70. Tarciscio Gazzini, The Rules on the Use of Force at the Beginning of the XXI Century, 11 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 319, 320 (2006); but see 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 93-96.
71. See Vienna Convention, supra note 63, art. 31, para. (3)(b).
72. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER
Kosovo 48 (Palgrave 2001).
73. For more on the distinction between these two subjective elements, see infra note 97.
74. The fact that subsequent state practice can modify or repeal a treaty has received wide
support. See, e.g., DANILENKO, supra note 62, at 167. For more on the relationship between treaty
and customary international law, see Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 717
(Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989). Although one may object to this possibility on the basis that Article
103 of the U.N. Charter is clear that obligations contained in the Charter prevail over a member
state's "obligations under any other international agreement," Article 51 is a provision which
contains a right and not an obligation and is therefore unaffected by Article 103. Similarly, the
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The widening of the parameters of this exception leads to an inversely
proportional narrowing of the rule prohibiting force. For the modification of
such a fundamental rule to occur, a fundamental event or change of
circumstances would be necessary. 75  In this respect, although international
terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, the issue has been raised as to
whether the events of September 11, 2001 were a "constitutional moment" for
international law. 76 In certain respects such a proposition may appear accurate
because, due to the aftermath of the events of this day, it can now be said with
more certainty that the actions of non-state actors may amount to an armed
attack giving rise to the right of self-defense. 77 However, the general acceptance
of a right to use force in prevention of such attacks and against states which pose
a threat of WMD is not so apparent.
An important customary international law requirement is that in the time
since any proposed change to the law is made, 78 "short though it might be,"
' 79
the general support of other states should emerge, manifested through
'international agreement' in forming new custom would in this instance be in regard to the right of
pre-emptive self-defense.
75. In connection with the source of international law under discussion here, it has been noted
that "[c]ustomary law continuously undergoes changes under the impact of changes in the
international community." DANILENKO , supra note 62, at 123. In terms of the prohibition of the
use of force as a treaty provision in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, under the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus contained in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, there is a
limited right of states to suspend, terminate or withdraw from a treaty where the effect of the
change in circumstances is "radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty." However, there is no evidence in the NSS documents that the United States is
claiming such a right.
76. Murphy uses this phrase to mean "a moment in which seismic shifts in international law
occurred." Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REv. 699, 719-
20 (2005).
77. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 3-6; Kimberley N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity,
Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 INT'L COMP.
L. Q. 141, 151 (2007). Although in a much criticized limiting statement, the ICJ noted in the Wall
advisory opinion that "[a]rticle 51 of the Charter... recognizes the existence of an inherent right
of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one state against another state." Wall advisory
opinion, supra note 13, at 194 (emphasis added).
78. Harris has questioned whether such a proposed change should be seen "more as an 'offer',
which other states can accept or reject." See HARRIS, supra note 65, at 38-39. However, the US
proposal on this occasion is more of an assertion than an offer.
79. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 62; indeed, "[i]t is probably in the nature of any
customary process that, being informal, it is not possible to specify precisely how much time is
required for a customary rule emerge [sic]." I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 20 n.47. However,
for reasons outlined below, the notion of 'instant' customary international law is rejected in
connection with custom on this occasion. See infra D.II.
80. Because the proposed new custom would not abolish the prohibition of the use of force or
carve a new exception out of it, such as the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would, it is
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consistent and uniform state practice and opinio juris.8 1  Purely in terms of
numbers, at the time of the release of the 2006 NSS, the United States assertion
of a right to use unilateral force in pre-emption in 2002 did not appear to have
gained this type of support. 82 However, to discount the impact of the claim in
the NSS on this basis alone would be to dismiss other relevant factors that
should be taken into consideration in evaluating any actual change or potential
evolution of customary international law.
B. The Significance of Specially Affected and Powerful States
It is a well established proposition that customary international law is not
made simply by the majority and the practice of states with a particular interest
in the subject matter is of great relevance. 83 The criterion for the formation of
customary international law "is in a sense qualitative rather than quantitative.
That is to say, it is not simply a question of how many states participate in the
practice, but which States." As Professor Lauterpacht observed:
assuming that we are confronted here with the creation of new international
law by custom, what matters is not so much the number of states participating in
its creation and the length of the period within which that change takes place, as
the relative importance, in any particular sphere, of states inaugurating the
change. 85
This weighted significance of states with a particular interest can also be
seen in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. For example, in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases it was noted that maritime nations have more of an impact upon the
law of the sea than land-locked countries. 86  This also arose in the Nuclear
possible that the support required does not need to be that of "the international community of
States as a whole." Vienna Convention, supra note 63, at art. 53; see North Sea Continental Shelf,
supra note 62. For more on the forms that support for customary international law purposes can
take, see infra D.I and DII.
81. See DANILENKO, supra note 62, at 94-98; see infra note 97.
82. This statement is proved simply by the fact that after its initial claim in 2002, the right was
rejected by the Non-Aligned Movement, representing 118 states. See supra note 17; see also
Christine Gray, A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?, 56 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 157, 163-64 (2007). However, if the weight to be attributed to the various forms of state
practice is measured in terms of its 'cost' to the state undertaking it, the 'cost' for each of these
states in making such an objection in a collective form, where this is just one of many issues
discussed and may involve no more than a simple vote on the final document, is possibly less than
if they had gone to the effort to make their objections known on an individual basis. For more on
the idea of 'cost' in customary international law formation, see MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER,
AND THE POWER OF RULES, 156-57 (Cambridge University Press 1999); see also infra note 104.
83. HARRIS, supra note 65, at 37.
84. I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 26.
85. H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 394 (1950).
86. 1969 I.C.J. 3, supra note 62, at 73.
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Weapons case where special attention was paid to the practice of states with
nuclear weapons when considering whether their use was lawful.
87
The same reasoning can be applied to the right of pre-emptive self-defense.
Determining "who is 'specially affected' will vary according to
circumstances," 88 but not only is the United States the self-appointed leader in
the so-called 'global war on terror,' it can also be seen that, on the whole, the
states that have accepted or shown sympathy towards the principle behind pre-
emption in light of the publication of the 2002 NSS are more significant for the
purposes of customary international law formation in this area as they appear
to be states which can be said to be "specially affected" 90 by the threat of
terrorism. Furthermore, "there is no evidence that the customary law-making
process necessarily requires supportive participation of virtually all 'specially
affected' states. It appears that a new practice can acquire a widespread and
representative character with the participation of just a certain representative
number of 'specially affected states."' There is some evidence that certain
states from different political, economic and legal systems 92 and from different
continents 93 have shown sympathy towards the principle behind pre-emption.
94
However, the position of these states as "specially affected" on this issue
may not be the only relevant factor in considering their impact upon customary
international law formation. For example, it has been noted that "custom may be
created by a few states, provided those states are intimately connected with the
issue at hand, whether because of their wealth and power or because of their
special relationship with the subject-matter of the practice." 95  Consequently,
even though only a few states showed any open support towards the principle
87. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 263 (Jul. 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
88. I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 26.
89. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text for a non-exhaustive list of these states.
90. This term comes from the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 1969 I.C.J. 3, supra note 62,
at 42.
91. DANLIENKO, supra note 62, at 95 (emphasis added).
92. That is, not just western democracies, as North Korea demonstrates. See supra Part 1.
93. That is, from North America, Australia, Europe and Asia. See supra Part I.
94. The idea that a regional or special custom might develop between these states is discounted
as such a custom could only arise if the use of force in pre-emption was to be invoked against
those who had agreed to it.
95. MALCOM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (Cambridge University Press 5th ed. 2003)
(emphasis added); See also CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1956) (noting that "every international custom is the work of power");
Gazzini, supra note 70, at 327 (stating that "considerations of power and even economic
bargaining are certainly not extraneous" to customary international law formation). More
specifically, in terms of the power of the United States having an impact upon customary
international law, see Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 5.
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behind the right, their special interest and powerful nature perhaps contribute to
a leveling of the balance.
If this appears sympathetic to the claim of the United States, this is perhaps
qualified by the fact that even these states exhibited inconsistent support and did
not go as far as to formally adopt pre-emptive self-defense as a legal doctrine in96
quite the same way as the United States did in the NSS documents. This is
indicative of the fact that, even amongst these states, opinio juris had not
developed to meet the claim of the United States. Furthermore, after its express
rejection by the High-Level Panel and the Secretary-General of the U.N. and the
implicit rejection by the ICJ, it is unlikely that any state, even the United States,
would have invoked pre-emption in justification under the basis that it currently
possessed the legal right to act in this way, that is, opiniojuris. Consequently, at
the time of the release of the 2006 NSS it is safe to conclude that no
modification of thejus ad bellum regime had occurred.
C. Opinio Necessitatis9 7 and the Pre-emptive Use of Force
Although the actual impact of the 2002 NSS has been limited, this does not
mean that the claim made in the document did not potentially lay the foundations
for a modification in the future. Indeed, as Thirlway noted, the initial perceived
necessity behind a state's claim plays a part in the modification of customary
international law: if a State decides to act in a way inconsistent with a recognized
rule of custom, it will no doubt have good and sufficient reason for doing so, and
perhaps even for thinking that its approach should be generalized - that the rule
needs to be modified consistently with its action. It will however, almost by
definition, not be acting because it is convinced that there is already a new rule.
The process by which customary rules change and develop thus presents
theoretical difficulties; but it is a process which does occur.98
96. For example, although John Howard, the Prime Minister of Australia has been a close ally
of the United States in the war on terror and perhaps the strongest supporter of the theory behind
pre-emption, no mention is made of it in Australia's defense updates on its security strategy or its
national security in either 2003 or 2005 respectively. See Ministry of Defence, Australia's
Security Strategy: A Defence Update 2003, Feb. 26, 2003 (Austl.),
http://www.defence.gov.au/ans2003/Report.pdf, see also Ministry of Defence, Australia's National
Security: A Defence Update 2005, Dec. 15, 2005 (Austl.),
http://www.defence.gov.au/update2005/defence-update_2005.pdf.
97. This is formed from the full title of the subjective element of customary international law,
opinio juris sive necessitatis, that is, an "opinion as to law or necessity[,]" so that rather than a
state manifesting a belief that a practice is required by law (opiniojuris) it is instead a belief that a
practice is required by necessity (opinio necessitatis). See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 122 (Malcom D. Evans ed., Oxford University
Press 2d ed. 2006).
98. Id. at 125. Judge Lachs, in his dissenting opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
stated
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This is an implicit recognition of the importance that opinio necessitatis can
play in the formation of customary international law; that is, although a practice
is not currently regarded as lawful, it is regarded as necessary for social,
economic, political or military reasons.9 9 In other words, the term signifies that
the acts of generators must have been carried out with the awareness, or at the
very least the instinct, that they were meeting a social necessity. 100
It appears that since the release of the 2002 NSS, although there is an
absence of opinio juris, there are signs amongst certain states that opinio
necessitatis has formed as to the right of pre-emptive self-defense in combating
terrorism,' 0 ' if not yet as to combating the threat of state development and
possession of WMD. This leads to the question of the impact of the persistent
advocacy of the claim in the 2006 NSS and whether this has led to a hardening
of opinio necessitatis into opiniojuris.102
D. The 2006 NSS: The Fruits of Persistent Advocacy?
Whereas after the release of the 2002 NSS there was at least some notable
reaction by states, this does not appear to have been the case after the release of
its successor in 2006. At the time of writing since the release of the 2006 NSS,
there appears to be little sign of the fruits of persistent advocacy emerging and
little change in the eneral position of states regarding the issue of the pre-
emptive use of force. This is not without significance, however, as it is a well
to postulate that all States, even those which initiate a given practice, believe themselves to be
acting under a legal obligation is to resort to a fiction - and in fact to deny the possibility of
developing such rules. For the path may indeed start from voluntary, unilateral acts relying on the
confident expectation that they will find acquiescence or be emulated.
See 1969 I.C.J. 3, (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs) supra note 62, at 231.
99. ANTONIC CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 157-58 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2005).
100. Georges Scelle, Rgles g~n~rales du Droit de la Paix, 46(IV) Recueil des Cours 432, 433
(1933). ("d'abord que les actes g~n~rateurs doivent avoir W accomplis avec le sentiment, ou tout
au moins l'instinct, d'ob~ir A une n&cessit6 sociale.").
101. Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 5, at 547.
102. This is a gradual process. See DANILENKO, supra note 62, at 124 (stating that "[w]hile early
practice in conflict with the existing rules inevitably constitutes a violation of accepted law, the
deviating behavior may acquire the quality of law-changing practice if new claims gradually find
support among states." (Emphasis added)).
103. It should be noted that the N.A.M has reiterated its objection to the doctrine of pre-emption
since the release of the 2006 NSS: "Article 51 of the UN Charter is restrictive and ... it should not
be re-written or re-interpreted" and it "[o]ppose[d] and condemn[ed] ... the adoption of the
doctrine of pre-emptive attack." XIV Conference of Heads of State or Government of The Non-
Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba, Sept. 16, 2006, Final Document, 20(2), 22(5), available at
http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileld=1767. This is
an example of persistent objection and is significant. However, as was mentioned above, the
Havana document should not necessarily be attributed the same weight in terms of state practice
and opiniojuris as 118 separate objections by the individual states. Indeed, it is very likely that
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accepted proposition that for the purposes of customary international law state
practice also includes omissions and silence.1
0 5
1. The Significance of Silence
Silence by states in the face of a controversial claim can mean a number of
things. It may indicate that a state is tacitly agreeing 106 or acquiescing in the
claim, 107 or it may mean that it has "a simple lack of interest in the issue."
108
Generally, states in support of a claim made by another state rarely openly show
such support, preferring to acquiesce in the claim instead. Thirlway implicitly
rejects the idea that states normally support a claim by positively championing
its cause:
[i]t should not be overlooked that State practice is two-sided; one State
asserts a right, either explicitly or by acting in a way that impliedly constitutes
such an assertion, and the State or States affected by the claim then react either
by objecting or by refraining from objection. The practice on the two sides adds
up to imply a customary rule, supporting the claim if no protest is made, or
excluding the claim if there is a protest. The accumulation of instances of the
one kind or the other constitutes the overall practice required for establishment
of a customary rule. '
09
this numerical tally includes some states which would not have made a separate objection outside
of the organization. For more on the persistent objector rule, see Jonathan Chamey, The Persistent
Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.1
(1985). For the N.A.M's objection after the claim made in the 2002 NSS, see supra notes 16 and
82.
104. The I.L.A. Report noted that "[o]missions are perfectly capable, if they are sufficiently
unambiguous, of constituting acts of State practice." I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 36.
However, states omitting to physically invoke a right with the threat or use of force as its basis can
not be taken as state practice and opiniojuris for the proposition that no right exists. The reasons
why states fail to take such physical action are multifarious and, in this case, there is a fundamental
rule prohibiting such conduct. As Danilenko has described, "the ascertainment of the precedential
value of abstentions may create serious practical problems because it may not always be clear what
is the reason behind a particular 'negative' practice. [] In view of the dubious nature of abstentions,
there should always be positive indications that a particular course of conduct is regarded as
obligatory by the members of the international community." DANILENKO, supra note 62, at 86
n.35.. See also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10, at 29 and 96 (Sept. 7).
What is more significant here is the silence by states in the face of the claim by the United States.
105. Akehurst, supra note 65, at 10; SHAW, supra note 95, at 80 n.46.
106. BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 8.
107. Aust has written that "[w]hen a state that has an interest in the matter is silent, it will
generally be regarded as acquiescing in the practice." ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Cambridge University Press 2005). This implies that states that do not
have an interest which remain silent are also acquiescing.
108. BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 8.
109. Thirlway, supra note 97, at 123.
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Harris makes this observation in more explicit terms: "[flor the purposes of
the formation of rules of customary international law, consent is commonly
indicated by state practice not in the form of positive statements or other action
approving or following the practice in question, but of acquiescence." '
10
A state may also remain silent because of factors not related to its opinion
as to the legality of the claim at hand. For example, a state may remain silent
because it is a close ally, recipient of aid or a trading partner with the claiming
state, not because it necessarily believes the proposed custom is lawful or
because it simply does not care. After the reiteration of the claim in the 2006
NSS, some states may not have taken an official position on the claim because
they are not threatened by terrorism and WMD, and also would not be a target of
one of the states that has shown sympathy towards the right in principle.
Additionally, states that may have been more vociferous in their support of the
reiteration of the doctrine may have been deterred by the colossal failures of
Iraq, l and those who may have been more vociferous in their rejection may
have been deterred because they are recipients of aid from, or trading partners
with, the states that have shown sympathy to the claim. "12
Consequently, in realty due to the multifarious reasons why states may
refrain from protesting, silence cannot be equated with acquiescence, but for the
purposes of customary international law formation, if a state remains silent and
has actual and constructive knowledge of the claim being made (and given the
prominence of the United States in international affairs, it is unlikely that many
states would not have been aware of the claim), this will amount to acquiescence
in it. Nevertheless, before such conclusions are reached as to the meaning of this
reaction in connection with the current claim, the right should perhaps be
invoked in practice.
2. Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
It is the position of some scholars that the physical acts of states contribute
to the formation of customary international law rather than those of a verbal or
110. Harris, supra note 65, at 40. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of acquiescence is
to "accept or consent to something without protest [,]" whereas MacGibbon defines it as "silence
or absence of protest in circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an
objection." MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
143 (1954). In practice, the "mode of manifesting individual opinio juris is not very common:
customary law-making is dominated by tacit forms of acceptance expressed by supportive conduct
or absence of protests." DANILENKO, supra note 62, at 108.
111. See Duncan Kennedy, Iraq: The Case for Loosing, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 667 (2006); see
also text accompanying supra notes 51-54, and infra note 157.
112. See supra note 95.
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written nature. 113 However, while there are certainly circumstances where 'talk
is cheap,' 114 this "goes more to the weight to be attributed to the conduct rather
than to any inherent inability of verbal acts to contribute to the formation of
customary rules." 115
Although it has been acknowledged that there aplears to be "no inherent
qualitative difference between the two sorts of acts", there is a rebuttable
presumption of a gravitational difference between them so that acts of a physical
nature carry more weight than those of a verbal or written nature. 117 The weight
to be attributed to physical acts will normally involve more of a 'cost' to the
undertaking state than conduct of a less active nature. 118 Furthermore, while not
diminishing the importance of state practice in a verbal or written form, state
practice through physical action, at least by the state making the initial claim,
can have the effect of solidifying the intentions of the proponent state and
permits the claimed right to be seen in practice, perhaps prompting firmer
reaction from other states. The reaction of other states is important in defining
the acceptable elements and boundaries, if any, of the claimed right. Indeed, it is
one thing for the right to be asserted in theory, but it is quite another for it to be
put into practice, particularly a right with the gravity of the use of force as its
basis.
Particularly relevant dictum to the case is Judge Reid's dissenting opinion
in the Fisheries case, where the following was said of state practice:
[t]his cannot be established by citing cases where coastal States have made
extensive claims, but have not maintained their claims by the actual assertion of
sovereignty over trespassing foreign ships. Such claims may be important as
starting points, which, if not challenged, may ripen into historic title in the
course of time. The only convincing evidence of state practice is to be found in
seizures, where the coastal State asserts its sovereignty over the water in
113. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The Concept Of Custom In International Law 88 (Cornell
University Press 1971); Karol Wolfke, Custom In Present International Law 42 (Martinus Nijhoff
2d ed. 1993).
114. I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 13.
115. Id, Abstract statements of a legal position have been recognized as being of value in the
jurisprudence of the ICJ and do, in many cases, hold importance. See, e.g., 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra
note 40, at 97-109; Nuclear Weapons, supra note 87, at 259-61. However, as Danilenko has
commented, "[a]lthough the relevance of official statements for the ascertainment of custom is thus
recognized, it remains controversial what weight should be accorded to them in custom
formation." Danilenko, supra note 62, at 88.
116. I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 14.
117. Indeed, "despite the growing recognition of verbal forms of practice, as a source of law
custom continues, as before, to be based primarily on real and concrete state practice." Danilenko,
supra note 62, at 91.
118. See supra notes 82 and 103.
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question by arresting a foreign ship and by maintaining its position in the course
of diplomatic negotiation and international arbitration.
This is perhaps applicable in the current claim of the pre-emptive use of
force. The Bush administration certainly has made extensive claims reiterating
the right of pre-emptive self-defense in the two successive NSS documents, but
it now perhaps needs to maintain its claim by the actual assertion of the right in
practice as the only convincing evidence of state practice.
Given that at the present time this claimed right has not been put into
practice by any state since the release of the 2002 NSS, perhaps until this occursS 120
the silence should not be assumed simply as acquiescence. Although thus far
the development of opinio necessitatis appears to be in regard to the use of
unilateral pre-emptive force in combating terrorism, 12 1 the current situation
concerning Iran's alleged production of WMD may provide the circumstances
for the United States to invoke the right for the first time. 122 Indeed, as will be
discussed, the current events viewed in light of the broad framework of the claim
and the attention focused upon this state in the 2006 NSS may provide the
United States with the necessary trigger it has set itself for the invocation of pre-
emptive self-defense.
IV. IRAN: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE?
As noted above, the 2006 NSS was clear in its assertion that the United
States faces no greater threat from a single state than that posed by Iran,
123
particularly its nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism. At the time of
writing, Iran is continuing to push ahead with its nuclear program, 124 despite the
sanctions imposed upon it by the Security Council in Resolutions 1737 and
1747, passed under Article 41 of the UN Charter on 23 December 2006 and 24
119. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 191 (Dec. 18).
120. See Schachter, supra note 74, at 731.
121. See supra note 101.
122. The ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case that "[i]f a State acts in a way prima facie
incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the
rule." 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 98. Conversely, it follows that if the United States was to
employ pre-emptive self-defense and to appeal to that exception as stated, rather than as is
normally the case simply to "self-defense," then this will have the prima facie inverse effect of
weakening rather than confirming the rule.
123. See supra Part II. C.
124. Ian Black, Iran Declares Nuclear Programme Irreversible, The GUARDIAN (London), Feb.
26, 2007, at 16, available at www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,,2021309,00.html; Iran
Insists on Nuclear Programme, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6351137.stm.
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• , 125March 2007, respectively. Furthermore, the United States has now publicly
accused Iran of assisting Iraqi insurgents by providing them with sophisticated
roadside bombs. 126 This belligerent rhetoric is similar to that witnessed in the
lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consequently, it is necessary to be clear on
the exact legal grounds upon which force could be used by the United States
against Iran and, in particular, what part the claim to the right to use pre-emptive
force might play in resolving this crisis.
A. Security Council Authorization: Express and Implied
Under the ideal of collective security, the United States could use force
against Iran by Security Council authorization through the regime established by
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 127  However, this authorization is normally
preceded by Security Council resolutions condemning a particular situation as a
threat to,128 or breach of,129 international peace and security and imposing
sanctions on the transgressing state or states concerned. 130  The fact that
sanctions have been imposed by the Security Council against Iran shows there is
concern regarding its nuclear ambitions and action, however minimal, is being
taken. Yet given that only three resolutions have been passed in connection with
the current crisis, 131 none of which expressly determine that the situation was a
threat to international peace and security and the passing of the economic
sanctions in resolutions 1737 and 1747 was problematic, due primarily to
Russian and Chinese sympathies with Iran, the prospect of a Security Council
resolution expressly authorizing the use of force at this time appears distant, if it
exists at all. 132
125. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
126. US Accuses Iran Over Iraq Bombs, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/6351257.stm; Micheal Hirsch & Maziar Bahari,
Rumours of War, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 2007, at 28, 35.
127. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 252-64 (Oxford
University Press 2d ed. 2004).
128. See S. C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992) (determining that "the situation
in Somalia constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security" and preceded the authorizing
of "all necessary means" mentioned in S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992)).
129. See S. C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (determining that Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait constituted "a breach of international peace and security" and preceded the authorizing
of "all necessary means" mentioned in S. C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990)).
130. See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6 1990) (preceding Security Council
resolution 678 which authorized the use of "all necessary means" against Iraq in 1990).
131. S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 125;
S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 125.
132. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Legal Case against War with Iran, JURIST, Feb. 13, 2007,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/02/legal-case-against-war-with-iran.php ("The
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The imposition of mere economic sanctions at the current time would also
make it particularly difficult for the United States to make any sort of case for
the use of force under the doctrine of implied authorization. 133 Nevertheless, the
real test for this doctrine will be determined by future events now that the sixty
day deadline in Security Council Resolution 1747 for Iran to suspend its nuclear
activities has passed.' 34 These events may determine whether the United States
attempts an argument that it, or the international community, has been implicitly
authorized to use force against Iran to ensure compliance. As one of the possible
elements of such a justification, on February 22nd 2007, the Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency issued a report which noted that rather
than suspending its program, Iran was in fact expanding it.135 Furthermore, as
the events preceding the launching of Operation Allied Force in 1999
demonstrated, the fact that there has only been limited action by the Security
Council on the situation may not deter the United States from claiming implied
authorization if it appears that express authorization will not be provided because
of one or two of the Security Council's members. Nevertheless, before the
United States attempts such an argument it is perhaps likely the Security Council
would at least first need to determine the situation to be a threat to international
peace and security.
B. Self-Defense
If the United States were to fail to obtain the 'golden fleece' of Security
Council authorization, it potentially might use force as self-defense under Article
51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. This is addressed under
the traditional and currently accepted paradigm of self-defense and also under
the United States' proposed expanded paradigm.
Security Council refused to authorize America's tough economic sanctions package against Iran,
so there is little likelihood it would authorize a military strike.").
133. This is force used by a state or group of states where, although there has been no express
authorization by the Security Council, there has been much concern expressed about a particular
state or situation, for example where it has been condemned by the Security Council as a threat to
international peace and security. See GRAY, supra note 127, at 267-70 (providing an example of
this controversial doctrine as part of the justifications for Operation Allied Force against Serbia in
1999).
134. S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 125, para. 13, at 3.
135. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, para. 28, at 5, IAEA Doc. Gov/2007/8, (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf.
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1. The Traditional Paradigm
For a right of self-defense to arise under the traditionally accepted paradigm
there must be an 'armed attack' 136 or the 'imminent' prospect of one. 137  In
relation to the threat posed by Iran's WMD, the concern at present is not that it
actually has a weapon, but that it is in the process of producing one.
138
Consequently, no armed attack has occurred and the prospect of one occurring
presently could not be classified as 'imminent' under its traditional meaning,
139
thus leading to a necessity of self-defense which is "instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation". 14  Although
Iran's nuclear aspirations may be a violation of its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty 14 1  and give rise to non-forcible proportional
countermeasures, they do not give rise to a right of self-defense.
However, this is not the end of the road as far as an action in self-defense
by the United States against Iran under the traditional paradigm is concerned.
Along with concern in the 2006 NSS regarding the threat posed by Iran in the
ambiguity surrounding its nuclear ambitions, there is also concern over the threat
posed by its support for terrorism and, in particular, Iraqi insurgents. Although
Iran has denied this link, 143 if the reports are accurate then whether a right of
136. See U.N. Charter art. 51, (stipulating the requirement of an armed attack before a State can
act in self-defense); 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 103 (stating that "[i]n the case of individual
self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of
an armed attack."); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J 161, 186 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil
Platforms] (also asserting that there must be an armed attack before the use of force in self-
defense).
137. See supra notes 41-43.
138. See Daniel Dombey, FT Interview: Mohamed ElBaradei, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb.
19, 2007,
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=Ft+Interview+dombey&aje=false&id=070219008008&ct
=0 (statement of the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei) (stating that Iran "is at
least five to ten years away" from having a nuclear bomb).
139. But see supra note 43 and accompanying text (the U.S. reinterpreting the word so as to
expand its temporal meaning in light of the contemporary threats of terrorism and WMD, as made
out in the 2002 NSS).
140. See Letter from Daniel Webster, supra note 42; see also Paul Reynolds, Would an Attack
on Iran Be Legal?, BBC NEWS, May 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/4754009.stm.
141. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
142. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 49-54,
U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Dec. 12, 2001).
143. Julian Borger et al., Ahmadinejad Puts His Faith in the "Wise People in US" to Avoid
Conflict, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,201 1809,00.html (quoting a Fox News interview with the
leader).
2007]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
self-defense against Iran arises will depend upon the level of its involvement. If
the insurgents have been sent 'by or on behalf of Iran, 144 then there is a strong
argument for attributing the bombings in Iraq to Iran. In terms of whether these
bombings could meet the threshold necessary for an armed attack, it was noted
by the ICJ that the mining of a single ship was sufficient to qualify as an armed
attack bringing into play the right of self-defense. 145 If this is the case, then the
continuous bombing on Iraqi territory causing many deaths might also be.
146
Under these circumstances, there would be a right for Iraq to use force against
Iran in self-defense or, more likely, to declare itself the victim of an armed attack
and request that the United States take action in collective self-defense.
147
Although U.S. soldiers may be killed by these attacks, they are in Iraq at the
invitation of the Iraqi government and, therefore, "Iraq is the state with the legal
authority to respond to such wrongs."' 148 However, the reports do not lay such
claims against Iran; instead, the current claim is that these weapons have been
provided by Iran.149 In these circumstances, as the Nicaragua case made clear,
"the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" is not sufficient to
144. See 1986 I.C.J. 14 supra note 40, at 103-04. This is the "effective control" test established
by the ICJ in Nicaragua and endorsed in Article 8 of the International Law Commission Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). However, the "effective
control" test has been the subject of criticism by the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadic case where, although the threshold of
"effective control" was maintained for a single private individual or a group that is not militarily
organized, control by a state over subordinate armed forces or military or paramilitary units may be
of an "overall" character, that is, rather than the issuing of specific orders or its direction of each
operation, the state has a role in "organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the
military group in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to
that group." See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 137, (July 15, 1999).
Consequently, the responsibility of Iran may depend on the extent of the insurgent's military
organization. See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 595 (Feb. 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7349.pdf.
145. 2003 I.C.J. 161, supra note 136, at 171.
146. Nevertheless, the ICJ notes in Nicaragua that a use of force had to reach a certain threshold
or gravity before a right of self-defense becomes available. See 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at
101. However, there have been arguments that this notion can not be seen in practice and the
customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality govern the response of a
state to a prior use of force. DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 194-95; see HIGGINS, supra note 63, at 251
(posing the following question: "[i]s the question of level of violence by irregular forces not really
an issue of proportionality, rather than a question of determining what is an 'armed attack'?"; see
also TARCISIO GAZZ[NI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133,
138 (Manchester University Press 2005).
147. These requirements were stipulated in the ICJ case concerning military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 103-04.
148. O'Connell, supra note 132.
149. See supra note 126.
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qualify as an armed attack 150 and may rather give rise to countermeasures by
Iraq.
Furthermore, there is also the issue of the threats made against Israel by
Iran, as noted in the 2006 NSS. 152 It is of course arguable that claiming that
Israel should be "wiped off the face of the earth" is more than saber-rattling and
amounts to a specific threat towards a state, which violates the prohibition of the
threat of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, providing a right to invoke
countermeasures against Iran in response. But this is as far as it goes. In the
absence of Israel claiming that it was the victim of an 'armed attack', or one that
is real and imminent, and requesting assistance in collective self-defense, no
force could be used by the United States to invoke this as a justification.
2. The Expanded Paradigm: Pre-Emptive Self-defense
At the present time, the United States is left with no options to use force
against Iran except perhaps through the invocation of its claimed right of
unilateral pre-emptive self-defense as reasserted in its 2006 NSS. The crisis over
Iran may be the defining moment for this claim. In regard to Iraq, the United
States did not ultimately have to rely on the doctrine of pre-emption as it argued
that the use of force was justified on the basis of Security Council
authorization. 153 By contrast, the situation unfolding between the United States
and Iran holds the prospect of the United States invoking the doctrine in the
absence of another legal leg to stand on. 154 A 'pure' invocation of pre-emptive
self-defense by the United States in such a high-stakes situation would be telling.
The pre-emptive sections of the 2006 NSS, given their focus on Iran,
provide the United States with the opportunity to either practice what it preaches
or have its failure to take action highlight the dichotomy between theory and
practice. To adopt the language of the 2006 NSS, even though "uncertainty
remains as to the time and place" of an attack by Iran, "the consequences of an
attack with WMD are potentially so devastating" that the "principle and logic of
pre-emption" dictates that the United States "cannot stand idly by as grave
150. 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 103-04.
151. See G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 142. However, if recent reports are accurate, then the
diplomatic channel may be being explored by the United States in relation to Iran's alleged support
for the insurgency in Iraq. See also Suzanne Goldenberg, US Invites Iran and Syria to Talks on
Iraq in Reversal of Bush Policy, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 28 2007, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2023016,00.html.
152. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 20.
153. See supra text accompanying note 8.
154. In regard to an invocation in connection with Iran's WMD threat, see Suzanne Goldenberg,
US Accused of Drawing Up Plan to Bomb Iran, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2021434,00.html.
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dangers materialize."' 155 The 2006 NSS claims that it was Saddam Hussein's
underlying "refusal to remove the ambiguity that he created" regarding Iraq's
WMD capability that "forced the United States and its allies to act,"15 6 rather
than it simply not complying with Security Council resolutions. In this respect,
if the situation is viewed through the lens of the 2006 NSS, this ambiguity can
now be clearly seen in connection with Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Given the failures of the Iraq conflict, it is unlikely there will be a regime
change by force in the foreseeable future, 157 as this will be affected more by the, . 158
non-forcible strategy of the promotion of democracy. However, this does not
mean pre-emptive force of a more limited nature will not be used. If such a use
of force was carried out successfully, perhaps involving a limited military strike
targeting only nuclear reactors that would eliminate the threat once and for all,
causing minimal collateral damage in the process, and with a limited response by
Iran with no significant increase in tension in the Middle East, it is possible the
doctrine would gain some additional support and legitimacy in connection with
the prevention of production of WMD to match some of the existing opinio
necessitatis in regard to terrorism. As the ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case,
"[r]eliance by a state on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the
principle might, if shared in principle by other states, tend towards modification
of customary international law."' 5 9 If the United States carried out a successful
strike against Iran and justified it as pre-emption, although the success of this
strike would not determine its legality, it may increase the chances of other states
sharing in principle the novel right, increasing the chances of the incident
tending towards a modification of customary international law. However, this
155. 2006 NSS, supra note 1, at 23.
156. Id. at 24.
157. Kennedy, supra note 111, at 679. The argument that Operation Iraqi Freedom provided a
disincentive to invoking the doctrine for such purposes is furthered by glancing at the events that
have occurred, and are occurring, in the aftermath of such a regime change. The necessary post-
invasion plan is an area which has been highlighted as seriously flawed. Nearly four years after
the invasion, there is open violence on an unprecedented scale which is on the brink of, if not
already in the midst of, civil war between the Shia and Sunni sections of the population. This has
led to massive Iraqi civilian and coalition military casualties. At least at the time of writing, there
appears to be no end in sight for the violence that has gripped Iraq. Indeed, the worst suicide
bombing of the war occurred on Saturday, February 3 rd, 2007 claiming the lives of 135 in a Shia
market. See Peter Beaumont, 135 Die in Bombing as "Civil War" Grips Iraq, OBSERVER
(London), Feb. 4, 2007, available at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2005490,00.html. More importantly for the Bush
administration, there appears no foreseeable prospect of withdrawal of its troops. This has hit the
Bush administration hard and in particular on the domestic front where the pressure on the Bush
administration has been intense in recent times.
158. See supra Part II.
159. 1986 I.C.J. 14, supra note 40, at 108-09.
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perhaps remains solely within the realms of possibility and not reality. With the
logistical difficulties of carrying out such a strike and with threats emanating
from Iranian President Ahmadinejad that any state that attacks it will be
"severely punished,"' 160 a successful limited military strike of Iran's nuclear
installations along these lines appears unlikely. This diminishes the potential of
the Iran crisis being the benchmark for the United States' claim of a right to pre-
emptive self-defense.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall, the United States' claim to the right of unilateral pre-emptive force
in the 2006 NSS is much the same as that made in 2002, albeit with a change in
focus of the rogue states identified. In terms of contributing to the establishment
of the doctrine of pre-emption as a legal right, the 2006 NSS appears to offer no
more than its predecessor. If by persistently advocating the right of pre-emption
in the 2006 NSS the United States was attempting to move the debate closer to
establishing this as a firm legal right in thejus ad bellum available to all states in
international law, it has missed an opportunity. If this was the serious intention
of the United States, then it would have been wise to have at least made an
attempt to include more detail on the contours of the claimed right, in particular
what will trigger its invocation, how the requirement of proportionality will be
met (given that "in the absence of clear evidence as to the nature and scope of a
particular threat the requirement that any response be proportionate is necessarily
difficult to apply" 161), and how force would be employed against non-state
actors in its fight against terrorism. In short, if the United States intended that by
its persistent advocacy the doctrine be considered more seriously it should have
expanded the boundaries of the debate by beginning to solidify how the legal
doctrine might operate in practice.
However, the nebulous nature of the claim may have been intentional. It is
possible that the doctrine of pre-emption was included again in the 2006 NSS not
because the Bush administration seriously intended for it to be a legal
proposition, or that it could work in practice, given that its finer details were not
(or could not be) presented in the NSS. Rather, it may have been reasserted as a
deterrent to the rogue states and terrorists identified in the 2006 NSS or in the
realization that its absence from the second NSS of the Bush administration
would be seen as a sign of weakness in the eyes of its adversaries and as
recognition that it had simply gotten it wrong. An admission of failure of this
nature is simply not something that the Bush administration would do lightly.
160. See Borger, supra note 143.
161. Gray, supra note 2, at 448.
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Ultimately, however, it may not matter what the initial intention behind the
claim was if states adopt it into their practice. 162 Although it is not possible to
conclude that there is firm opinio juris connected with the right, there is
evidence of state practice demonstrating opinio necessitatis amongst some
specially affected states in connection with its use for combating terrorism.
However, if the doctrine is to have any possibility of gaining wider acceptance
and progress into customary international law, it needs first to be seen as a
doctrine which could work in practice. So far, since the release of the 2002
NSS, this has not been the case. Although officially justified on the basis of
Security Council authorization, the failures connected with Operation Iraqi
Freedom, countering an alleged threat of WMD possession by regime change,
have not boosted the chances of acceptance by other states. Additionally,
although the prospect of the doctrine's invocation in respect of Iran's WMD
production is possible, the prospect of a successful limited strike seems bleak.
Whilst the 2006 NSS appears to keep the door open as to the doctrine
making its mark on the jus ad bellum, it should not be forgotten that it also
appears to open the door further to diplomatic options playing a role in resolving
the identified threats. Although diplomacy has more limited prospects of
success in connection with the threat posed by non-state terrorism, given the lack
of reciprocity between the actors, this tool has proved to be effective in the battle
against WMD production, possession and proliferation by states, for example in
South Africa, Libya and, most recently, North Korea. 163 Given the 2006 NSS
report's increased interest in combating the identified threats using non-military
measures, there is hope yet that the present crisis in Iran, and those that arise in
the future, will be resolved peacefully.
162. Akehurst has made the point that "[i]t is not necessary that the State making such
statements believes them to be true; what is necessary is that the statements are not challenged by
other States." Akehurst, supra note 65. Reisman and Armstrong make a similar claim: "In the grip
of mimetic effects.., the actual policy of the United States becomes less important than the policy
that continues to be imputed to it." Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 5, at 549. Also,
"it is not so much a question of what a state really believes (which is often undiscoverable,
especially since a State is a composite entity involving many persons with possibly different
beliefs), but rather a matter of what it says it believes, or what can reasonably be implied from its
conduct. In other words, it is a matter of what it claims."
I.L.A. Report, supra note 62, at 33.
163. See text accompanying supra note 60.
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